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THE MEANINGS OF ‘LIFE’: BIOLOGY AND
BIOGRAPHY IN THE WORK
OF J. S. HALDANE (1860–1936)
By Steve Sturdy
READ 14 APRIL 2010 AT GLASGOW CALEDONIAN UNIVERSITY
ABSTRACT. In the course of his somewhat unorthodox career in science, the
physiologist John Scott Haldane occasionally turned to biography to portray the
aims and values that he associated with such a career. But the same concerns can
also be discerned in his scientific writings which drew, in large part, on experiments
he conducted on himself. For Haldane, biology, as the science of life, was inseparable
from biography, as the depiction of a life in science; and he embodied both these
enterprises in his own autobiological investigations. Analysing these connections in
Haldane’s work serves to illuminate the contested role of science in the growth of
professional society and the emergence of the intellectual aristocracy.
British science underwent a process of professionalisation from about the
mid-nineteenth century onwards, with the growth of new employment
opportunities and the establishment of new career pathways. But exactly
what a scientific career should look like, and particularly what status
and purpose should be accorded to academic science, remained an
open question until well into the twentieth century. This is evident in
the career of the physiologist John Scott Haldane (1860–1936). Haldane
is now chiefly remembered for his groundbreaking research into the
delicate biological mechanisms underlying the regulation of breathing
rate and other physiological processes, and he is often credited as one
of the founders of the modern concept of homeostasis. But his scientific
work ranged far more widely, to include research into health and safety
in industrial workplaces and elsewhere, and Haldane would eventually
withdraw from academic life to spend the rest of his career in the service
of government and industry.
Haldane’s life in science was thus in itself something of an experiment:
an exploration of the kinds of opportunities and activities that might
be open to a professional scientist. He would occasionally reflect on the
nature of such a life in short biographical writings, some of which I
will examine in this paper. But I will go on to argue that his thinking
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about the social role of science and scientists was not confined to his
biographical writings alone. We can trace the same concerns in another,
more important aspect of Haldane’s work, namely his physiological
research. For Haldane as for many of his contemporaries, such research
involved an investigation into the nature of life. I will argue that Haldane’s
concern to understand life in the biological sense was continuous with
his understanding of life in a biographical sense. My contention is that
Haldane’s research into how living organisms maintain their functional
integrity in a changing physical environment also provided a way of
thinking about his own career as a scientist working in a changing social
environment. This convergence of biology with biography is all the more
evident for the fact that Haldane performed the vast majority of his
experiments on himself or on his colleagues; he was at once the subject
and the object of his own research, and his life as a scientist involved a
constant examination of his life as a living organism. Haldane’s pursuit
of a scientific career, and the choices he made about how to live life as a
scientist, were thus inseparable from his embodied experience of his own
biological life; in effect, autobiography was indistinguishable in Haldane’s
work from what we might call ‘autobiology’.
Haldane’s career in context
Let me start by briefly outlining Haldane’s career.1 He was born in 1860,
into a minor branch of the Scottish aristocracy. At sixteen he matriculated
at Edinburgh University, taking a general MA degree in 1879. He then
moved on to study medicine, graduating MB, CM in 1885. Rather than
practice medicine, however, he began looking for a career in scientific
research and teaching. The opportunities for making a living by this kind
of work were at that time very limited, with only a handful of full-time
posts available in British universities and medical schools. But Haldane’s
ambitions were encouraged by his uncle, John Burdon Sanderson, one of
the first generation of full-time academic medical scientists in England,
who in 1882 had been appointed to the newly created Wayneflete Chair of
Physiology at the University of Oxford.2 In 1887, Haldane moved south to
become Demonstrator in the Oxford School of Physiology. Once in post,
he gave ample proof of his ability as a teacher and researcher. Promoted to
lecturer in 1894 and reader in 1907, he would dominate the development
1 Basic details of Haldane’s life and scientific work can be found in C. G. Douglas, ‘John
Scott Haldane 1860–1936’, Obituary Notices of Fellows of the Royal Society, 2 (1936), 115–39. For
more extended biographical studies, see Steve Sturdy, ‘A Co-ordinated Whole: The Life
and Work of John Scott Haldane’ (Ph.D. thesis, University of Edinburgh, 1987); Martin
Goodman, Suffer and Survive: The Extreme Life of Dr. J. S. Haldane (2007).
2 Terrie M. Romano, Making Medicine Scientific: John Burdon Sanderson and the Culture of
Victorian Science (Baltimore, 2002).
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of physiological research in Oxford from the early 1890s to the outbreak
of the First World War.
Despite his evident ability, however, Haldane’s career in the
Department of Physiology did not proceed entirely as he had hoped.
The difficulties can be traced to his understanding of the purpose of
medical science, and especially of physiology, which differed significantly
from that of many of his contemporaries. Many of those who championed
the establishment of medical science as an occupation in its own right
took the view that this could best be achieved by claiming independence
from the practical expectations of doctors and others, and by insisting
instead on the value of science for its own sake. ‘Pure’ science, untainted
by the need to demonstrate immediate practical benefits, offered the best
means of generating authoritative knowledge of the natural world, they
argued.3 Physiology, concerned with elucidating fundamental processes
occurring in living organisms, and increasingly identified by the pursuit
of specialised programmes of experimental research, lent itself well to the
idea of pure science; and physiologists were accordingly in the vanguard
of the movement to establish independent careers in medical science.4
Practical benefits could still be expected to follow from the application
of the knowledge they produced, but most physiologists argued that the
realisation of such benefits was better delegated to subaltern ‘applied’
disciplines such as pathology or public health or indeed medicine itself.
Haldane shared his colleagues’ desire to see the creation of full-time
positions for medical research and teaching, and agreed that physiology
was in the vanguard of that movement. But instead of endorsing a
strategy of academic purity and abstraction, he held that physiology
should demonstrate its worth by looking beyond the academic laboratory
and engaging directly with the practical concerns of government and
3 Robert F. Bud and Gerrylynn K. Roberts argue that the language of ‘pure’ and ‘applied
science’ acquired particular salience in the Royal Commission on Scientific Instruction
and the Advancement of Science (Devonshire Commission) appointed in 1870: Science
Versus Practice: Chemistry in Victorian Britain (Manchester, 1984), 140–51. The rhetorical use
of that language in late nineteenth-century Britain is also discussed in Thomas Gieryn,
‘Boundary-Work and the Demarcation of Science from Non-Science: Strains and Interests
in Professional Ideologies of Scientists’, American Sociological Review, 48 (1983), 781–95. On
parallel developments in the USA, see Ronald Kline, ‘Construing “Technology” as “Applied
Science”: Public Rhetoric of Scientists and Engineers in the United States, 1880–1945’, Isis,
86 (1995), 194–221.
4 The literature on the growth of physiology as a scientific discipline at this time is
correspondingly large. See, inter alia, Gerald L. Geison, Michael Foster and the Cambridge
School of Physiology: The Scientific Enterprise in Late Victorian Society (Princeton, 1978); Stella V.
F. Butler, ‘Centres and Peripheries: The Development of British Physiology, 1870–1914’,
Journal of the History of Biology, 21 (1988), 473–500; Stewart Richards, ‘Conan Doyle’s
“Challenger” Unchampioned: William Rutherford F.R.S. (1839–99), and the Origins of
Practical Physiology in Britain’, Notes and Records of the Royal Society of London, 40 (1985–86),
193–217.
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industry. His own research work was consistent with this view. Throughout
his career, he would spend much of his time in industrial workplaces,
investigating the problems of industrial health and safety that were
arousing widespread concern at that time. This did not mean that he
was uninterested in advancing knowledge of fundamental biological
processes; indeed, he is generally remembered for doing just that. Rather,
Haldane took the view that no meaningful distinction could be drawn
between pure and applied science. His own scientific work reflected
this: many of his most apparently abstract physiological researches were
directly stimulated by practical problems he encountered in mines and
factories, and revealed a fruitful dialectic between his efforts to elucidate
the fundamental processes of respiration and his concern to promote
safe and healthy working conditions in industry.5 At the same time, his
research was informed by an overtly philosophical understanding of the
nature of life that was at odds with the reductionist and mechanistic
perspective that most other biologists of that time adopted, either
implicitly or explicitly.6 Haldane’s heterodox understanding of the nature
and aims of physiology would have adverse consequences for his academic
career.
In 1895, Burdon Sanderson resigned from the Chair of Physiology
to take up the post of Regius Professor of Medicine, as part of his
larger strategy to build a complete medical school at Oxford. Haldane
applied for the vacant Chair of Physiology, but the post went instead
to Francis Gotch, a one-time assistant to Burdon Sanderson who had
gone on to become the first full-time professor of physiology at University
College, Liverpool. Meanwhile, Burdon Sanderson tried to steer Haldane
towards research and teaching in hygiene and public health – a more
clearly ‘applied’ field of science for which he evidently felt his nephew’s
talents were more suited.7 In the event, Haldane remained within the
Department of Physiology, where his abilities as a researcher and teacher
effectively eclipsed Gotch’s largely undistinguished efforts.8 On Gotch’s
death in 1913, Haldane again applied for the Chair of Physiology, and
was again passed over, this time in favour of the neurophysiologist C. S.
Sherrington.9 Sherrington was undoubtedly brilliant, and would go on
5 Douglas, ‘John Scott Haldane’, 135; Sturdy, ‘A Co-ordinated Whole’, passim.
6 Steve Sturdy, ‘Biology as Social Theory: John Scott Haldane and Physiological
Regulation’, British Journal for the History of Science, 21 (1988), 315–40.
7 Sturdy, ‘A Co-ordinated Whole’, 251–6.
8 See for instance, Anon., ‘The Oxford Medical School’, British Medical Journal, 1 (1906),
1479–91, which characterises Gotch as ‘an original investigator . . . an inspiring teacher’,
but considers Haldane to be ‘universally recognised as one of the first of living physiologists’
(1486). It is telling that although Gotch was a Fellow of the Royal Society, no obituary of
him was ever published in the Society’s Proceedings.
9 Sturdy, ‘A Co-ordinated Whole’, 271–3.
the meanings of ‘life’ 175
to win the Nobel Prize for his work on the physiology of nervous reflexes.
But as we shall see, his selection over Haldane owed as much to the latter’s
views on the nature and purpose of physiology as to Sherrington’s own
achievements as a researcher.
On being rejected for the second time, Haldane resigned his position in
the Oxford University Department of Physiology. He retained a Research
Fellowship at New College, Oxford, and he continued to collaborate with
university colleagues in the laboratory he had built at his home. But other
than this, he would pursue the remainder of his career largely outside
academia, promoting the value of scientific expertise in the solution of
problems of industrial regulation and management: as a Gas Referee,
employed by the Board of Trade to regulate the production of town gas;
as director of a coal industry laboratory charged with promoting safety
measures in mines; as president of the Institution of Mining Engineers;
and as an expert member of various Royal Commissions and other official
investigations.10
These basic events of Haldane’s career locate him at a point in British
history when the proper nature and social role of professional science
was still subject to negotiation and contestation. But the emergence of the
professional scientist at that time was part of a much wider process of social
transformation. This was the period when the new professional middle
class consolidated their position as key figures in the maintenance and
management of an increasingly differentiated and organised industrial
society.11 The world was shifting from one dominated by an old elite
of inherited wealth and aristocratic status, to one increasingly mediated
by technical, managerial and other forms of expertise. Such expertise
was commonly certified by academic training. Consequently, as part
of this process, the British university system was itself professionalised
and expanded in the decades from the mid-nineteenth century onwards.
Salaried university professorships, along with an insistence on peer
evaluation as the main criterion for career advancement, served to secure
10 Apart from the work he undertook during the first world war, which is described in
detail in Sturdy, ‘A Co-ordinated Whole’, 276–355, and in Goodman, Suffer and Survive,
268–328, Haldane’s career after resigning his Oxford University readership has received
only incidental scholarly attention. His contribution to the development of diving suits
and high-altitude pressure suits is discussed at length in Alexander von Lu¨nen, ‘Under the
Waves, Above the Clouds: A History of the Pressure Suit’ (Ph.D. dissertation, Technische
Universita¨t Darmstadt, abridged version, 2010), and his role in debates over miners’ lung
diseases in Arthur McIvor and Ronald Johnston, Miners’ Lung: A History of Dust Disease in
British Coal Mining (Aldershot, 2007), 69–73.
11 Harold Perkin, The Rise of Professional Society: England since 1880 (1989).
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the autonomy of the emerging profession, leaving academics free to foster
new kinds of scholarship, including a greater emphasis on the pursuit of
research as one of the main aims of academic life.12 Haldane’s own
discipline of physiology was at the forefront of the professionalisation
process. Not only was it one of the leading disciplines in the struggle
for salaried academic posts and the promotion of research; it was also
central to the establishment of academic training as a necessary basis for
admission to the medical profession.13
Haldane was thus a transitional figure in a broad and far-reaching
social transformation. Indeed, as a member of an old landed family
who chose to cultivate a professional career, he was at once actor and
exemplar in the shift from an aristocratic towards a more professional
social order. The Haldanes were prominent within that small group
of families – mostly descended from the lesser aristocracy – identified
by Noel Annan as playing a disproportionately influential role in the
intellectual and professional life of twentieth-century Britain.14 As is
clear from the success of this ‘intellectual aristocracy’ in founding its
own dynasties, the new professional society did not represent a complete
break with the culture of an earlier ruling class; at least in part, it involved
a transformation within the ruling class and its means of ruling.15 As
Haldane’s troubled trajectory makes clear, however, there was no single
view on what the new social order should look like, let alone on the
role that scientists should occupy in that order. Haldane, like all those
who endeavoured at that time to build professional careers, was engaged
in a project to create a new polity in which their own special skills and
abilities would enjoy particular authority. For the time being, the outcome
of that project remained unclear. Professional science, in particular, did
not develop along pre-determined lines. How scientific expertise should
be constituted, what kind of authority it should assert and how scientists
might best contribute to the organisation and governance of modern
society, were all still being worked out.
12 R. D. Anderson, Universities and Elites in Britain since 1800 (1992); A. J. Engel, From
Clergyman to Don: The Rise of the Academic Profession in Nineteenth-Century Oxford (Oxford, 1983);
Sheldon Rothblatt, The Revolution of the Dons: Cambridge and Society in Victorian England (1968).
The role of science in that transformation is examined in T. W. Heyck, The Transformation of
Intellectual Life in Victorian England (1982).
13 Thomas Neville Bonner, Becoming a Physician: Medical Education in Britain, France, Germany,
and the United States, 1750–1945 (New York and Oxford, 1995), 236–79.
14 Noel G. Annan, ‘The Intellectual Aristocracy’, in Studies in Social History, ed. J. H. Plumb
(1955), 241–87.
15 Perry Anderson, ‘Components of the National Culture’, New Left Review, 50 (1968),
3–57, at 15–16; William Whyte, ‘The Intellectual Aristocracy Revisited’, Journal of Victorian
Culture, 10 (2005), 15–45.
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Recasting auto/biography
The growth of the professional middle class was reflected in the changing
conventions of the literary genre of biography. Writing in the 11th
edition of the Encyclopaedia Britannica, Edmund Gosse – a personal friend,
incidentally, of the Haldane family – meditated on recent developments
in the genre. Where earlier forms of biography had treated the life of
the individual primarily as a personification of ‘certain definite moral
qualities’, Gosse argued, modern writings tended to reflect ‘the true
conception of biography as the faithful portrait of a soul in its adventures
through life’.16 More recent scholars have elaborated on this insight. Early
nineteenth-century biography was characterised by a predominantly
biblical hermeneutic, concerned with charting the career of individual
souls in their journey from sin to salvation. By the time Gosse came to
write his own autobiography in Father and Son, this pietism had given way
to a more relativistic view of individual development as an open-ended
process of personal self-realisation.17 This implied a shift in the social
message that readers should find in a biography. By showing how personal
salvation was to be sought by living a life of virtue within the constraints
of birth and station, earlier pietistic biography had taught primarily
how one should accept one’s place within a preordained religious and
social order. By contrast, the more open-ended narratives favoured by
Gosse were concerned with the problems of finding a place and a role
within a changing social order. As such, they conveyed a more functional
understanding of social virtue.
Gosse was himself aware of this shift in the exemplary aim of biography:
‘The only remnant of the old rhetorical purpose of “lives” which clearer
modern purpose can afford to retain is the relative light thrown on
military or intellectual or social genius by the achievement of the selected
subject.’18 Gosse’s use of the word ‘genius’ is significant. In his 1869 study
of Hereditary Genius, Francis Galton – himself a member of the intellectual
aristocracy – had attributed it to those individuals who achieved the
highest social distinction for their ‘originality of conception, for enterprise,
for activity and energy, for administrative skill, for various acquirements,
for power of literary expression, for oratory, and much besides of general
values, as well as for more specially professional merits’.19 In effect, Galton
relativised genius by recasting it, not simply as intellectual brilliance, but
16 Edmund Gosse, ‘Biography’, Encyclopaedia Britannica, 11th edn (Cambridge, 1910), III,
952–4, at 952.
17 Linda H. Peterson, Victorian Autobiography (New Haven, 1986), 156–91.
18 Gosse, ‘Biography’, 953.
19 Francis Galton, Hereditary Genius: An Inquiry into its Laws and Consequences (1869), 7.
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as the ability to play an animating role in society.20 Gosse took this a step
further, locating genius in precisely those spheres of activity – military,
intellectual, social – where the new professionals were most actively
seeking to assert their influence. As conceived by Galton and Gosse,
the notion of ‘genius’ served the purposes of the new professional middle
class in ways that the notion of a life redeemed by Christ’s blood did not. It
reflected the idea that lives should be valued, not for their exemplification
of transcendental moral values, but for their influence on the development
of society and culture. Biography, as a chronicle of a soul’s ‘adventures
through life’, provided a way of illuminating and exemplifying the role
that the new professional class was coming to play in society.21 That
is not to say that biography did not continue to present a vision of a
moral life. But late nineteenth- and early twentieth-century biography
reworked earlier moral tropes in ways that were more appropriate to
a professionalising society. Hard work, self-sacrifice and the importance
of ‘character’ all continued to be idealised as moral virtues, but now
inflected by a new stress on the importance of independent thought, self-
determination and social leadership.22 As Robbie Gray observed in his
analysis of Victorian autobiography, ‘Middle-class men were concerned
to present themselves as makers of the world they inhabited.’23 Special
virtue was often accorded to those whose personal convictions led them
to sacrifice their own advancement to the advancement of some greater
social good: a life well lived was a life devoted to a particular social aim
or mission.
Complementing this concern with social mission was an almost
ethnographic interest in the particular fields or domains of activity in
which such a mission might be pursued. This was particularly evident
in the burgeoning sub-genre of collective biography, itself a notably
successful division of the Victorian biographical enterprise.24 Tellingly,
the Dictionary of National Biography – the most monumental achievement
of that sub-genre – listed its subjects’ occupations before detailing their
parentage, in a move which epitomised the ascendancy of profession
20 Cf. Simon Schaffer, ‘Genius in Romantic Natural Philosophy’, in Romanticism and the
Sciences, ed. Andrew Cunningham and Nicholas Jardine (Cambridge, 1990), 82–98.
21 David Amigoni looks at how a new generation of professional academic historians
sought to wrest biography from the hands of gentlemanly ‘men of letters’, and thereby
to assert their own authority over the training of young minds for public service: Victorian
Biography: Intellectuals and the Ordering of Discourse (Hemel Hempstead, 1993).
22 Ira Bruce Nadel, Biography: Fiction, Fact and Form (1984), 13–38. See also Stefan Collini,
Public Moralists: Political Thought and Intellectual Life in Britain, 1850–1930 (Oxford, 1991).
23 Robbie Gray, ‘Self-made Men, Self-narrated Lives: Male Autobiographical Writing
and the Victorian Middle Class’, Journal of Victorian Culture, 6 (2001), 288–312, at 307. See
also Donna Loftus, ‘The Self in Society: Middle-class Men and Autobiography’, in Life-
Writing and Victorian Culture, ed. David Amigoni (Aldershot, 2006), 67–86.
24 Nadel, Biography, 13–66.
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over birth.25 But the convergence of biography with occupational
differentiation found its most intense expression in another sub-genre
of biography, namely the professional obituary. As distinct professional
groups began to establish themselves as the guardians of particular social
functions, so the publication of obituaries in professional journals came to
serve the purpose of representing these new occupations to their members
and to the public at large. Scientific obituaries were a case in point. The
practice of publishing obituary notices of eminent scientists dated back
to later eighteenth-century France.26 British scientists were initially slow
to follow suit, reflecting the relatively unprofessionalised state of British
science at that time.27 Towards the end of the nineteenth century, however,
the number of obituaries published in the Proceedings of the Royal Society, and
the number of words devoted to each obituary, began to increase rapidly.
By the 1930s the Society judged this undertaking sufficiently important to
warrant the publication of separate volumes of obituary notices. The same
period also saw an enormous growth in professional journals devoted
to specific scientific disciplines, many of which also carried obituary
notices. Such obituaries were principally concerned with exemplifying
the activities and values that defined a particular science; the information
they provided was overwhelmingly about the contributions the subject
had made to the advancement of their discipline, while those aspects
of the subject’s life that did not relate directly to professional concerns
were clearly relegated to second place. The writing of scientific lives –
both in obituaries but also in a growing number of longer biographies
of particularly important scientists – thus epitomises the way that the
exemplary function of biography came, by the early twentieth century, to
subserve the project of professional consolidation and advancement.28
25 David Amigoni, ‘Life Histories and the Cultural Politics of Historical Knowing: The
Dictionary of National Biography and the Late Nineteenth-century Political Field’, in Life and
Work History Analyses: Qualitative and Quantitative Developments, ed. Shirley Dex, Sociological
Review Monograph 37 (1991), 144–66.
26 Charles B. Paul, Science and Immortality: The E´loges of the Paris Academy of Sciences (1699–1791)
(Berkeley, Los Angeles and London, 1981).
27 Biographies of individual scientists did become increasingly common during the early
nineteenth century, but these were usually iconic founder-figures rather than more ordinary
practitioners. See e.g. Richard Yeo, ‘Genius, Method, and Morality: Images of Newton in
Britain, 1760–1860’, Science in Context, 2 (1988), 257–84; L. S. Jacyna, ‘Images of John Hunter
in the Nineteenth Century’, Medical History, 21 (1983), 85–108.
28 Given the interest that historians of science have taken both in the professionalisation
of science and the function of scientific biography, it is surprising to find that they have
scarcely considered the relationship between the two. See, for instance, Michael Shortland
and Richard Yeo, eds., Telling Lives in Science: Essays on Scientific Biography (Cambridge, 1996);
Thomas So¨derqvist, ed., The History and Poetics of Scientific Biography (Aldershot, 2007).
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Haldane’s biographical reflections
Even as science gained in professional solidarity and social influence,
there remained room for disagreement over just what form that influence
should take. Scientific biography was one site where individuals could
exemplify their different visions of what science should be. Haldane
was among those who availed themselves of the opportunity to do so,
making several contributions to the biographical literature of his chosen
profession. While these writings celebrated such general scientific values
as dedication to the pursuit of new knowledge, they also served to illustrate
and endorse the particular approach to science that Haldane himself
favoured.
A case in point is the obituary he wrote of the German pathologist
and early advocate of the germ theory, Max von Pettenkofer.29 Haldane
published this piece in the first volume of the Journal of Hygiene, of
which he was himself one of the founding editors. The new journal
reflected Haldane’s views on the practical value of science. Rather than
championing a particular line of disciplinary research, it provided a
common outlet for scientists from different disciplines who were keen
to advance the practice of public health. ‘With a view to increasing
the general usefulness of the Journal of Hygiene’, the editors declared,
‘we propose not to limit the contributions entirely to reports of original
observations and experiments, but to accept and encourage discussions
of administrative and practical questions, the importance of which
is apt to be overlooked in scientific journals.’30 The Journal was an
attempt to establish a programme of inquiry defined more by the
sphere of social action to which it was addressed than by any narrowly
disciplinary concerns with scientific purity. In his memoir, Haldane
portrayed Pettenkofer as a tragic hero of this kind of practically oriented
science.
Trained as a chemist, from the 1850s Pettenkofer turned his scientific
skills to public health work. Despite his chemical background, he was
alert to the biological aspects of disease causation, favouring a form
of germ theory over the miasmatic views that had dominated German
public health measures in the first half of the century. However, his
particular conception of germ theory and of its implications for sanitary
practice was challenged by Robert Koch in the 1880s. Pettenkofer
held that the virulence of disease germs depended on the natural and
human environment in which they found themselves; consequently, he
favoured an approach to public health that focused on understanding
29 J. S. Haldane, ‘The Work of Max von Pettenkofer’, Journal of Hygiene, 1 (1901), 289–94.
30 George H. F. Nuttall, John Haldane and Arthur Newsholme, ‘Introduction’, Journal of
Hygiene, 1 (1901), 1–2.
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and improving that environment. Koch, by contrast, sought first to
elucidate the behaviour of germs isolated in the laboratory, and only
secondarily to apply that knowledge to matters of public health; control
the germ, through measures such as quarantine and the development
of vaccines, and you controlled the disease. Pettenkofer fared badly
in the ensuing controversies, as Koch’s theories and ideas of practice
won favour among public health administrators. Pettenkofer became an
increasingly marginal figure in German medical science, and committed
suicide in 1901.31 Haldane’s commemoration of Pettenkofer in the Journal
of Hygiene signalled the new journal’s commitment to a more holistic,
environmentally oriented conception of public health than the laboratory-
centred bacteriological reductionism favoured by Koch and his followers.
It also celebrated Pettenkofer’s exemplary devotion to his scientific
mission. In 1892, Pettenkofer had publicly drunk a culture of cholera
microbes sent to him by Koch, in order to prove that germs alone did
not cause disease. Recalling this event, Haldane reproduced Pettenkofer’s
statement that he was prepared to ‘die in the service of Science as a
soldier on the field of battle . . . The man who wills to stand higher than
an animal must be ready to sacrifice even life and health for a higher
ideal good.’32 Pettenkofer had survived that particular battle, but lost the
war for recognition in his own lifetime. Haldane’s obituary vindicated
Pettenkofer, and announced his determination to carry forward the
programme of practically engaged science that his life exemplified.
Biography thus provided Haldane with a way to reflect on his own
position as a scientist. It offered consolation for the difficulties of his own
career;33 it vindicated his commitment to views that were unpopular
among his peers; and it served to exemplify and validate the particular
professional project that he pursued. It also offered an outlet for Haldane’s
reflections on the role of professional service more generally. In 1929, one
of his cousins published a family history which traced the Haldane line
back to its first appearance in the thirteenth century, and included brief
biographies of the more noteworthy members of the family. In many
respects, this volume can be read as a straightforward example of the
older genre of genealogy, which identified social status with the patrilineal
inheritance of titles and property. But in a short essay that he contributed
31 The most comprehensive account of Pettenkofer’s rise and fall can be found in Richard
J. Evans, Death in Hamburg: Society and Politics in the Cholera Years 1830–1910 (Oxford, 1987), 237–
75, 490–507.
32 Haldane, ‘Max von Pettenkofer’, 294.
33 This consolatory function is even more apparent in the biography he published of
J. J. Waterson, a Scottish scientist who, far more than Pettenkofer, was marginalised in
his lifetime and only recognised some years after his death: J. S. Haldane, ‘Memoir of
J. J. Waterston’, in The Collected Scientific Papers of John James Waterston, ed. J. S. Haldane
(Edinburgh, 1928), xiii–lxviii.
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to this work, Haldane recast these earlier notions of inheritance in a more
modern and functionalised form.34
Haldane’s essay was informed by the ideas of the economist Henry
George, whose work he had read and approved as a young man. In
the 1880s, George had mounted a well-publicised challenge to prevailing
legal notions of landed property. For George, land belonged not to those
individuals or families who had historically laid claim to it, but to the
communities who lived on it. Land in private hands should be regarded,
not as private property, but as a loan from the community, to be paid
for in rent or taxes rendered back to the community. That rent could be
generated by putting the land to productive use, or it might be raised from
elsewhere, for instance in the pursuit of a remunerative career. Possession
of land was not a right to be inherited but a privilege to be earned.
In effect, George functionalised the notion of ownership by linking it
to the fulfilment of a productive or otherwise valued role in the life of
the community.35 In his essay on the heredity of the Haldanes, Haldane
reiterated his own support for George’s idea of land tax:
Since the value of all property is dependent on the community within which it is held,
that community seems perfectly justified in gradually taking back an equivalent of the
interest on this value, with the result that, unless the holder of property can himself
earn the equivalent of that interest, the value of the property returns ultimately to the
community.36
He went on to argue that those views actually served to ratify the Haldane
family’s ownership of estates in Scotland.
‘Family “influence” and unpaid public service are powerless against
[taxation and death duties]’, Haldane told his readers, ‘so that those who
have inherited must, if they are to maintain the old position, adopt some
sufficiently lucrative profession or employment.’37 That was precisely
what the Haldanes had done. Pointing to his family’s long history of
public service, initially to patrons from the higher ranks of the aristocracy
and latterly in the professions, he observed that it was not just property
alone that had passed from father to son. There was also transferred
a ‘conscious and growing tradition, developing with the civilisation in
contact with it’.38 It was the inheritance of this tradition – of work, of
professional service and of social and cultural leadership – rather than any
mere legal fiction of heredity that had enabled one Haldane after another
34 J. S. Haldane, ‘The Heredity of the Gleneagles Family’, in J. Aylmer L. Haldane, The
Haldanes of Gleneagles (Edinburgh, 1929), 269–72.
35 Warren J. Samuels, Kirk D. Johnson and Marianne F. Johnson, ‘The Duke of Argyll
and Henry George: Land Ownership and Governance’, in Henry George’s Legacy in Economic
Thought, ed. John Laurent (Cheltenham, 2005), 99–147.
36 Haldane, ‘Heredity of the Gleneagles Family’, 270.
37 Ibid.
38 Ibid., 269.
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to earn the rent on their land.39 Haldane found vivid proof of this claim
in his own family history. Patrick Haldane, an eighteenth-century lawyer,
had earned a reputation for harsh and unpopular judgements. As a result,
his business had suffered, and his estates would have passed out of the
family had it not been for the intervention of a more prudent brother,
whose own success in the service of the East India Company enabled him
to redeem the lands. Haldane interpreted this story as evidence that the
continuity of family inheritance could only be sustained by continuously
adapting to new forms of public service: ‘Where there is failure in this
development’, he concluded, ‘the direct family line suffers disaster, and is
replaced by other family lines.’40
Haldane thus recast the older genre of genealogy in ways that were
consistent with new professional ideals of social achievement as the proper
basis of social standing. In so doing, he mirrored at the level of family
history the same shift as Gosse had observed at the level of individual
biography. For Haldane, what mattered was not the inheritance of fixed
qualities of property or status but rather a developing and adaptable
tradition of work and service that had enabled his family to sustain
its identity and integrity on its journey through changing historical
circumstances. At the level of the family as of the individual, functional
adaptation and achievement were the guarantors of personal virtue and
social success. Continuing eminence in social life was a matter of constant
self-making, in productive interaction with the world they inhabited and
helped to shape. As a member of the family whose cultural heredity he
described, Haldane plainly saw his own scientific activities as contributing
to this project of professional self-realisation.
Haldane’s science of life
Haldane’s reflections on professional life, and on his own life and role as
a professional scientist, were not confined to his biographical writings.
They are also evident in the work for which he is better known, namely
his research into life in the biological sense. Haldane’s interest in the
nature of life had initially developed during his undergraduate studies
at the University of Edinburgh, when he had become immersed in the
39 Haldane’s emphasis on the inheritance of tradition, rather than biological traits,
effectively set him apart from the efforts of Frances Galton, among others, to naturalise
inheritance as a biological phenomenon.
40 Haldane, ‘Heredity of the Gleneagles Family’, 269. Haldane was not alone in arguing
thus. Mrs Humphry Ward, herself a member of the intellectual aristocracy through her
family connection to Matthew and Thomas Arnold, worked similar arguments into her
best-selling novel Marcella. Her literary success had recently enabled her to acquire an estate
in Hertfordshire. John Sutherland, Mrs HumphryWard, Eminent Victorian, Pre-eminent Edwardian
(Oxford, 1991), 141–2.
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philosophical idealism that dominated British philosophy at that time.41
His decision to study medicine was inspired by that philosophy: ‘I had
become interested in questions, the answer to which can only be obtained
from the study of the processes of life’, he later explained.42 His reflections
on those questions would be published in the explicitly philosophical
articles and books that he published throughout his life. But they also
informed his pioneering research into the processes of physiological
regulation, and his explanation of how such processes enable living
organisms to maintain their integrity in the face of constantly changing
circumstances.
Haldane was not alone in seeking to understand the phenomena of
physiological regulation and integration. For instance C. S. Sherrington,
who secured the Oxford Chair of Physiology to which Haldane had
aspired, devoted much his career to addressing the same questions.43
But Haldane and Sherrington differed markedly in the kinds of answers
they offered. Sherrington, like most other physiologists of the time, held
that regulatory phenomena were ultimately reducible to physical and
chemical processes that could be understood in purely mechanistic terms;
and he saw his own research into the nervous coordination of muscular
action as validating this view of the living body as an exquisite machine.44
Sherrington acknowledged that his research was guided in part by ideas
of function and purpose which ‘trench on a kind of teleology . . . We
cannot but feel that we do not obtain due profit from the study of any
particular type-reflex unless we can discuss its immediate purpose as an
adapted act.’45 But he held that his own elucidation of reflex processes
effectively eliminated teleology by showing how everything that occurred
in the nervous system could be understood purely in terms of cause and
effect. ‘You thought Nature intelligent, even wise’, he concluded. ‘You
now know her devoid of reason . . . How can she have reason or purpose
being pure mechanism?’46
41 Sturdy, ‘A Co-ordinated Whole’, 12–75.
42 Anon. [J. S. Haldane], Letter to the Edinburgh Professors by a Medical Student – Edited, with
Preface, by a Graduate of Eminence (1890), 1.
43 Garland Allen includes both Sherrington and Haldane among those who effected a
shift from the ‘mechanistic materialism’ of mid-nineteenth-century physiology to a position
that he calls ‘holistic materialism’: Garland E. Allen, Life Science in the Twentieth Century
(Cambridge, 1978), 74, 88–94, 97. See also Donna Jeanne Haraway, Crystals, Fabrics and
Fields: Metaphors of Organization in Twentieth-Century Developmental Biology (New Haven, 1976).
44 The most detailed historical study of Sherrington’s scientific work is still Judith P.
Swazey, Reflexes and Motor Integration: Sherrington’s Concept of Integrative Action (Cambridge, MA,
1969).
45 C. S. Sherrington, The Integrative Action of the Nervous System, 2nd edn (New Haven, 1947),
236, 238.
46 C. S. Sherrington, Man on his Nature: The Gifford Lectures, Edinburgh 1937–8, 2nd edn
(Cambridge, 1951), 290.
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Haldane rejected this mechanistic understanding of vital phenomena.
Teleology was not simply a convenient fiction to guide physiological
investigation, he argued; rather, it was an irreducible aspect of biological
reality itself. Those who, like Sherrington, dismissed the idea of purpose
and adaptation as nothing more than a trick of the mind betrayed their
own metaphysical prejudices. From the viewpoint of idealist philosophy,
by contrast, it was evident that living processes really did involve a kind
of purposiveness. ‘[T]he distinguishing feature of vital activity is self-
preservation, or the conservation of the organism in a state of functional
activity’, Haldane declared in the first paper he ever published.47 Biology,
he later insisted, necessitated a view of living organisms as ‘expressing and
preserving their own identity’.48 Far from explaining away the appearance
of teleology, detailed physiological investigation simply showed that
biological processes were functional through-and-through. ‘The more
delicate and definite the physiological regulations which the advance
of experimental physiology is constantly discovering’, he declared, ‘the
stronger the case for vitalism.’49 Haldane saw his own research into the
regulation of breathing as a case in point: ‘The idea which gives unity
and coherence to the whole of the physiology of respiration is that of
the organic determination of the phenomena’, he argued.50 And not
just his own research: he saw Sherrington’s work on reflex phenomena
as proving the same point. According to Haldane, the latest research
into reflex action showed that ‘It is the end obtained, and not the physical
response, which is simple and definite . . . A mechanism which attains ends
in this way is inconceivable . . . even in the case of the complex activities
of the nervous system the teleological conception is the only one which is
ultimately capable of rendering the phenomena intelligible.’51 For all that
he might protest to the contrary, Haldane argued, Sherrington’s research
47 R. B. Haldane and J. S. Haldane, ‘The Relation of Philosophy to Science’, in Essays in
Philosophical Criticism, ed. Andrew Seth and R. B. Haldane (1883), 41–66, at 54.
48 J. S. Haldane, ‘Life and Mechanism’, Guy’s Hospital Reports, 60 (1906), 89–123, at 104.
49 J. S. Haldane, Organism and Environment as Illustrated by the Physiology of Breathing (New
Haven, 1917), 16–17. By ‘vitalism’, Haldane did not mean the kind of dualistic vitalism that
supposed that some kind of immaterial vital principal was super-added to a mechanical
body. Such a view involved ‘a breach, or rather innumerable breaches, in the intelligibility
of the universe’, he argued: J. S. Haldane, Religion and the Growth of Knowledge (1924), 14. His
own view was determinedly monistic, and late in life he would complain that ‘It has always
been difficult for me to prevent confusion between the ideas which I had adopted and the
old fashioned Vitalism’: J. S. Haldane, ‘Autobiographical Notes’ (n.d.), National Library of
Scotland, MS 20235, fo. 181.
50 J. S. Haldane, Mechanism, Life and Personality: An Examination of the Mechanistic Theory of
Life and Mind (1913), 88.
51 Haldane, ‘Life and Mechanism’, 118, 121.
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served to demonstrate that ‘here, as elsewhere in recent physiology, the
fact of co-ordination has been the keynote of recent work’.52
Haldane’s teleological understanding of regulatory processes also had
implications for where in the living body those processes should be seen
to reside. Sherrington’s view of nervous integration and coordination was
hierarchical and centralised, locating ultimate control over the organs
of the body in the central nervous system.53 For Haldane, by contrast,
organic regulation was radically decentralised; it was an essential property
of all the parts equally. Each part was exquisitely adapted to fulfil its
function within the organism as a whole, and tended naturally to act
in such a way as to maintain the functional integrity of that whole.
While the nervous system had an important role to play in mediating
communication and coordination between the various parts, it was still
only one organ among many, each of which contributed in its own way
to the maintenance of the whole. It was not even the dominant organ of
internal communication. For Haldane, delicate shifts in the constitution
of the blood conveyed far subtler messages about the changing state
of the body, which served to regulate even the actions of the nervous
system.54 Where Sherrington saw a centralised hierarchy of nervous
control mechanisms, Haldane saw a collaborative effort by the community
of organs to maintain their collective identity and function.
This disagreement between Haldane and Sherrington over the nature
of biological regulation had implications beyond the sphere of physiology
itself. It also reflected the way they tended to envisage the processes
of social regulation. The use of physiological metaphors to think about
society, and of social metaphors to think about biology, was commonplace
at that time. Indeed, as Roger Smith has argued, it involved more than
just explicitly metaphorical or analogical reasoning: talk about biological
processes often slipped seamlessly into talk about society, in ways that
elided any clear distinction between biological and social discourse.55
Ideas about the integrative action of the nervous system, in particular,
were commonly mobilised in discussions of social coordination and
integration. Just as the nervous system served to coordinate bodily action
52 J. S. Haldane, The Sciences and Philosophy: The Gifford Lectures, University of Glasgow, 1927
and 1928 (1929), 50.
53 Roger Smith, Inhibition: History and Meaning in the Sciences of Mind and Brain (1992), 179–90.
54 See for instance his chef d’œuvre, Respiration (Oxford, 1922), which emphasised the
mediating role of the blood in regulating a host of organic functions, and which ended
with a chapter of ‘General Conclusions’ arguing that the facts of respiration made clear the
impossibility of a mechanistic account of life.
55 Roger Smith, ‘Biology and Values in Interwar Britain: C. S. Sherrington, Julian Huxley
and the Vision of Progress’, Past and Present, 178 (2003), 210–42. See also Gregg Mitman,
‘Defining the Organism in the Welfare State: The Politics of Individuality in American
Culture, 1890–1950’, in Biology as Society, Society as Biology: Metaphors, ed. Sabine Maasen,
Everett Mendelsohn and Peter Weingart (Dordrecht, 1995), 249–78.
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by synthesising and communicating information about the state of the
body and its environment, so social action was seen to be coordinated
through the synthesis and communication of appropriate knowledge
of society and the world. Sherrington’s hierarchical, centralised model
of reflex integration and coordination mirrored widely held views
about government as a hierarchically organised, centralised ‘sensorium’
gathering social intelligence and using it to enact and administer
appropriate legislative and bureaucratic controls.56 It was a vision that
appealed to many scientists, who were inclined to see themselves as part
of that central sensorium, working in their laboratories to produce pure,
disinterested knowledge of the world and how best to act on it.57
Haldane dissented from this view of government, and of scientists’ role
in relation to it. Like many others who criticised ‘mechanical’ accounts
of social progress, he was suspicious of claims that social order could
be imposed through central legislation.58 Top-down compulsion was
ultimately incapable of imposing order where the members of society
were unable or unwilling to do what was demanded of them. Effective
government must proceed organically, in keeping with the disparate
abilities and expectations of the various members of the social organism.
Just like physiological regulation, Haldane took the view that social
regulation should be understood in radically decentralised terms – a
teleologically arranged, adaptive process of self-adjustment that took
place throughout society, and that thereby conduced to the maintenance
of the social organism as a whole. This was no mere metaphor. From
the perspective of philosophical idealism, Haldane saw the teleological
processes of self-regulation that made possible the continuing integrity
of a living organism as identical with those involved in the day-to-day
coordination of social life.59
56 See J. A. Hobson, ‘The Re-statement of Democracy’, Contemporary Review, 81 (1902),
262–72, for an instance of such reasoning by neurological metaphor.
57 For an earlier view of scientists, and intellectuals more generally, as belonging to the
social sensorium, see Elizabeth Green Musselman,Nervous Conditions: Science and the Body Politic
in Early Industrial Britain (Albany, 2006); Christopher J. Lawrence, ‘The Nervous System and
Society in the Scottish Enlightenment’, in Natural Order: Historical Studies of Scientific Culture,
ed. Barry Barnes and Steve Shapin (1979), 19–40.
58 Those whose political ideas were informed by philosophical idealism, in particular,
were inclined to denounce both the ‘mechanical’ economics of laissez-faire liberalism and
the ‘mechanical’ socialism of the Fabians and others further to the left, and to urge instead
what Andrew Vincent and Raymond Plant call a ‘moralised capitalism’ that located the
impetus to social betterment in the shared sentiments of citizens: Philosophy, Politics and
Citizenship: The life and Thought of the British Idealists (Oxford, 1984), 31–3, 83–7.
59 Sturdy, ‘Biology as Social Theory’. Haldane’s elevation of humoral over nervous
regulation, and the preference for decentralised rather than centralised government that he
associated with it, has interesting parallels with the view of Arthur Keith and Morley Roberts,
discussed in Rodhri Hayward, ‘The Biopolitics of Arthur Keith and Morley Roberts’, in
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This had implications for how he envisaged the role of scientists,
in particular. Rather than withdrawing into laboratories remote from
the rest of the world, they should involve themselves directly in society
in all its parts. His own work on the health conditions of workplaces
showed why and how. Physiological phenomena elicited in the laboratory
were not necessarily the same as those that occurred under the ordinary
circumstances of life. Consequently, if physiologists were to address the
problems occurring in the workplace, it was no use handing down
recommendations based solely on knowledge won in the laboratory,
since these would rarely prove applicable to local circumstances. Rather,
scientists should work directly with those affected to develop a proper
appreciation of problems they faced and to help them devise viable
and appropriate means of alleviating their problems. Rather than seek
to influence society through the agency of central government alone,
scientists should involve themselves in the local processes of social self-
regulation. It was just such a role that Haldane sought to fulfil through
his own engagement with the problems of industry.60
Conclusion: self-experimentation, autobiology and
autobiography
Haldane’s research into the nature of physiological regulation thus
reflected – indeed, served in effect to naturalise – the ideas about the
social function of the professional classes, and in particular the role of
professional scientists, in his occasional biographical writings. This was
precisely the kind of scientific life that he himself sought to live. In this
regard, it is striking to note that his biological view of life was in large
part based on experiments that he conducted on himself. Throughout
the course of his career in physiology and industrial health, Haldane
performed his physiological research almost exclusively on himself or
on other human subjects; whether investigating the minute regulation
of breathing or the effects of poisonous gases on miners, he was always
his own favourite guinea-pig. In effect, he used his own biological life
to demonstrate the principles of physiological regulation that he saw as
informing his chosen biographical life.61
Regenerating England: Science, Medicine and Culture in Inter-war Britain, ed. Christopher Lawrence
and Anna-K. Mayer (Amsterdam, 2000), 251–74.
60 Haldane’s views on how to effect reforms in industrial practice, and the limits of
legislation to do so, are discussed in Sturdy, ‘A Co-ordinated Whole’, 160–3, 174–83.
61 On the relationship of science, authority and identity in the practice of self-experiment
during the late eighteenth and early nineteenth centuries, see Simon Schaffer, ‘Self-
Evidence’, in Questions of Evidence: Proof, Practice, and Persuasion across the Disciplines, ed. James
Chandler, Arnold I. Davidson and Harry Harootunian (Chicago, 1994), 56–91; Noel B.
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In part, Haldane’s preference for self-experimentation had a
methodological basis. He took the view that vivisectional experiments on
animals, of the kind favoured by Sherrington and most other experimental
physiologists, inevitably abstracted from and often distorted the normal
processes of regulation. If the physiologist’s aim was to understand
normal biology, it would be better to investigate a whole, conscious
human being than an anaesthetised and vivesected animal. Moreover,
self-experimentation added an extra dimension to his physiological
observations by enabling him to take note, not just of objective
phenomena, but also of subjective experiences that might alert him to
subtle biological responses that were not registered by the particular
methods of observation and measurement that he happened to be
employing at the time.62 Physiology, for Haldane, was the science of
life, and all aspects of life, including the subjective, were grist to the
physiological mill.
More than this, however, physiology was an intimate part of the
way Haldane experienced himself as a biographical individual. His
scientific researches did not just elucidate biological life in the abstract;
they illuminated life as he himself lived it. Indeed, physiology – and
especially the teleological aspect of physiology that he himself stressed –
had direct practical consequences for how he chose to live. In his thirties,
he developed an irregular heart beat. The dominant cardiological wisdom
of the day dictated that anyone suffering from such a condition should
live as a semi-invalid, lest any sudden exertion precipitate a complete
cardiac collapse. But Haldane chose to consult J. S. Mackenzie, a general
practitioner from Burnley who had undertaken physiological research
into the action of the heart, and who was just beginning to make a
name for himself as a consultant cardiologist. Mackenzie’s understanding
of physiology was similar in important respects to Haldane’s, with its
emphasis on adaptation and the self-maintenance of vital function.
Mackenzie took the view that in many cases of heart disease, the heart was
able to adjust its action to compensate for whatever damage or disruption
it had suffered. In such cases, patients need not retire from active life,
but could continue to function as normal. Haldane heeded Mackenzie’s
advice, and went on to enjoy thirty more years of vigorous scientific and
professional activity.63 His functional understanding of physiological life
Jackson, ‘Critical Conditions: Coleridge, “Common Sense”, and the Literature of Self-
Experiment’, ELH, 70 (2003), 117–49.
62 Haldane’s experimental style is discussed further in Sturdy, ‘A Co-ordinated Whole’,
201–41.
63 J. B. S. Haldane, ‘The Scientific Work of J. S. Haldane’, in Penguin Science Survey 1961, ed.
S. A. Barnett and Anne MacLaren (Harmondsworth, 1961), Part 2, 11–33, at 19. McKenzie’s
contribution to the physiological redefinition of heart disease is described in Christopher J.
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was thus instrumental in enabling him to pursue his social function as a
scientist and a citizen.
Haldane’s life can thus be seen as a protracted biological experiment
– a study of the processes by which a living body responds, over days
and years, to the circumstances in which it finds itself. His physiological
researches served both to deepen his understanding of those processes
and to inform the life he lived: self-experimentation was not just a
means of scientific observation, but a way of experiencing life itself.
Haldane literally embodied his own knowledge of physiology,64 while
his elucidation of physiological processes can be seen, in a very real sense,
as a form of autobiography.65 At the same time, Haldane’s career was
also an experiment in the kind of life that might be lived by a professional
biologist, and his self-experiments served to dramatise the virtues that
he associated with such a life. In the course of his researches in mines
and factories, he repeatedly put himself in physical danger, and even the
experiments he conducted in the relative safety of his own laboratory
often involved a considerable degree of discomfort and sometimes risk.
Haldane’s approval of Pettenkofer’s willingness to ‘die in the service of
Science as a soldier on the field of battle’ found a peculiar resonance
his own life, particularly during the First World War when he undertook
research into poison gases for the War Office. In the course of this work,
he repeatedly risked exposure to dangerous concentrations of gas. His
health was impaired as a result, leaving him bent and often breathless.
For the rest of his life he would bear the stigmata of his devotion to science
and to the social purpose that he saw science as serving.66
For Haldane, physiology was thus a way of experiencing and expressing
some of the most intimate aspects of his very self; in effect, life as
autobiology was inseparable from life as autobiography. Physiological
investigation of his own body provided a means of addressing and
answering a multiplicity of questions about how he should live his life.
It helped him to understand his own health and his own capabilities; it
provided him with tools for investigating and managing industrial life; it
exemplified the principles of physiological and social regulation that he
believed should inform the role of science in the modern world; and it
Lawrence, ‘Moderns and Ancients: The “New Cardiology” in Britain 1880–1930’, Medical
History, Supplement No. 5 (1985), 1–33.
64 Christopher Lawrence and Steven Shapin, eds., Science Incarnate: Historical Embodiments
of Natural Knowledge (Chicago and London, 1998).
65 Cf. Thomas So¨derqvist, Science as Autobiography: The Troubled Life of Niels Jerne, trans.
David Mel Paul (New Haven, 2003), for a more psychologistic approach to science as
self-realisation.
66The risks Haldane ran in the course of his work are well described in Goodman, Suffer
and Survive, passim.
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provided an opportunity to enact the values that he saw as central to his
own professional identity.
As we have seen, this physiological understanding was at odds, on
practically every count, with the way that most leading physiologists
of his generation envisaged their own professional identity.67 Small
wonder, then, that he lost out to Sherrington in his bid to lead the
Oxford Department of Physiology. This was undoubtedly a blow to his
professional ambitions – but perhaps less so than it would have been
for many of his colleagues. Haldane was nothing if not adaptable, as his
self-experiments made abundantly clear, and the university laboratory
was only one of a number of environments in which he saw himself
pursuing a scientific life. His decision to withdraw from academia was far
from the end of his career, and he continued to pursue an active life in
science and industry. His resignation removed him from the mainstream
of professional science, however, and thereby from the purview of scientific
biography; his later career was largely glossed over in the obituaries
written on his death, and has received little attention from historians of
science. Haldane continued to live life on his own terms, but in the end,
those terms meant little to those who determined what an exemplary life
in science should look like.
67 Cf. Roger Smith, ‘The Embodiment of Value: C. S. Sherrington and the Cultivation
of Science’, British Journal for the History of Science, 33 (2000), 283–311.
